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This book illuminates the strategic debate over the importance of uncontrolled
spaces to groups like ISIS. ISIS’s effective use of low levels of indiscriminate
violence to take over large parts of Syria
and Iraq since 2013 demonstrates the
opportunity that ungoverned space affords malignant actors such as ISIS. The
ISIS movement began in the Kurdish areas of Iraq outside the reach of Saddam
Hussein in 2002, and moved quickly
into Anbar after identifying a security
vacuum following the invasion of Iraq in
2003. The collapse of the Assad government in eastern Syria and the defeat of
the Sunni Awakening militias and their
Iraqi security partners in several Iraqi
provinces (2008–12) once again created
space for the ISIS movement—this time
to recover from its 2007 defeat in Iraq.
Despite today’s blistering air campaign,
ISIS maintains control over most of
the Sunni areas of Iraq and Syria, and
arguably continues to develop deep
roots of support among the population.
The authors also highlight the problems
of both the Bush and Obama administrations’ war-termination strategies for
Iraq, in what has become a recognized
weakness in the American way of war.
Comfortable with outsourcing security
in Sunni areas to an untrained civilian
militia, both the Iraqis and Americans
turned a blind eye to the fact that ISIS
would make the Sunni Awakening an
important target in order to reestablish
core sanctuaries inside Iraq. The authors
point with amazement to the gradual
release of hard-core ISIS prisoners
(2008–11) back into their communities as one of several factors that helped
fuel the growth of ISIS from its post
surge nadir. While the reasons for this
shortsighted approach were undoubtedly political and legal in nature, these
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policies surely have contributed to the
untimely deaths of thousands of Iraqis
and the loss of much territory to ISIS.
As of 2015, nineteen of twenty of ISIS’s
top leaders were formerly in American
custody at Camp Bucca before being
released or escaping from custody.
Overall, I highly recommend this
book to policy makers, educators,
and military professionals who seek
a deeper understanding of the ISIS
movement. The authors have provided
a very believable representation of a
contemporary group that I believe will
be vindicated by additional research in
the future. Until that time, this book
will become the basis for most of our
understanding of a highly secretive
and effective pseudostate that remains
a threat to the region and beyond.
CRAIG WHITESIDE

Muth, Jörg. Command Culture: Officer Education
in the U.S. Army and the German Armed Forces,
1901–1940, and the Consequences for World War
II. Denton: Univ. of North Texas Press, 2013.
376pp. $29.95

Dr. Jörg Muth has written a serious
comparative account of the German
and American precommissioning
courses and general staff colleges from
1901 to 1940. Any new work comparing German and American military
effectiveness in the first half of the
twentieth century is guaranteed to
be controversial, and Muth certainly
achieves controversy. However, there
exists a significant revisionist school
of thought that offers an interpretation much different from Muth’s.
The May 2010 Society of Military History annual meeting, held at the Virginia
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Military Institute, featured a very wellattended roundtable that posed the
question of American or German operational or tactical superiority. The panel
moderator first asked how many of the
historians in the room had spent their
teenage years reading books promoting the vaunted Prussian and German
militaries. Nearly every hand went up.
Attracted by the works of Heinz Guderian, F. W. von Mellenthin, Liddell Hart,
J. F. C. Fuller, and others, many of these
teenagers grew up to be believers in the
conventional wisdom that the Germans
got it pretty well right. A complementary opinion was that the American
military forces got very little right. In
1986, Heller and Stofft’s America’s First
Battles became the standard history for
those who found in the German army
the bravery, intelligence, and aggressive
leadership they sought for America.
Muth and this reviewer were both in the
audience for the 2010 roundtable, and
both of our hands went up. However,
the revisionist school, with Michael
Doubler’s Closing with the Enemy (1994),
Keith Bonn’s When the Odds Were Even
(1994), and Peter Mansoor’s GI Offensive in Europe (1999) in the vanguard, is
alive and well. Perhaps the most useful
direct discussion of this historiographic
misalignment was Brian Linn’s piece in
the Journal of Military History (April
2002) “The American Way of War Revisited” and the comments in response
by Russell Weigley. Linn’s article and
Weigley’s response effectively frame the
distinct difference between interpretations that hold that the German armed
forces in both World War I and World
War II either were superior to the armed
forces of the United States or were not.
Muth has significant challenges using primary and secondary sources.
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He seems to relish his biases, and even
partly explains those biases in the “Author’s Afterword,” which Muth states was
added upon the sage advice of Edward
M. Coffman and Dennis Showalter.
Muth’s characterization of U.S. Army
officers—as people from whom he
should hide as a youth hanging out with
American soldiers on maneuvers—may be
more self-revelatory than Muth realizes.
Muth arguably tries to do too much
in a single book. His interpretation of
officer education in both Germany and
the United States focuses on two levels:
cadets in their precommissioning programs and field-grade officers attending
the equivalent of a general staff college.
Unfortunately, Muth does little beyond
making assertions unsupported by
evidence. These assertions are frequently
that American army officer education
was bad, and that the equivalent in Germany was good. He absolutely fails to
place either education system in its historical context, going so far as to say that
the word Prussia would be needlessly
complicating, and that he therefore only
uses Germany. Muth claims that “school
solutions” at Leavenworth were “always
the norm” and that “ineffective courses
were led by instructors who sometimes
lacked knowledge of their fields and
usually failed in didactics and pedagogics.” The only footnote to this paragraph
refers the reader to Craig Mullaney’s
Unforgiving Minute about junior officers
and tactical combat in Afghanistan. No
other source is cited, except for a vague
reference to a 2000 West Point graduate.
This is not an isolated case. There
are multiple unsubstantiated claims
throughout the book. For two more
examples, Muth says nothing of the
poor reputation of the XI Corps of the
Army of the Potomac when he asserts
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that German immigrants made for
highly respected soldiers in the American Civil War. He also misses the First
and Second Schleswig-Holstein Wars of
1848–51 and 1864, respectively, when
he asserts that in 1866 Prussia had not
been at war for nearly fifty years.
Despite these significant shortcomings, this reviewer hopes that Muth
continues to contribute to both the
conversation and the controversy.
PETER J. SCHIFFERLE

Philbin, Tobias R. Battle of Dogger Bank: The First
Dreadnought Engagement. Bloomington: Indiana
Univ. Press, 2014. 198pp. $32

This title is the latest work from American naval historian Tobias Philbin, who
is probably best known for his 1982
biography of Admiral von Hipper. In the
author’s words, the book is “designed to
provide new insights into the first battle
between the largest fighting machines
of the early twentieth century.” As such,
one might expect that a detailed analysis
of the conduct of the battle itself would
form the heart of the work, with perhaps
a supporting explanation of the tactics
employed on both sides and a discussion of whether these were or were not
in line with prewar expectations. This
could have been further supported by
brief chapters explaining the strategic
situation in the naval war at that point;
the role of the key personalities; and the
original thinking behind the development of the “fast Dreadnought cruiser”
as a warship type, insofar as it might
help explain the platform’s performance
in the battle itself. The work could then
have been concluded with a discussion
on the lessons learned and whether the
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proposed corrective measures were successful. In other words, the focus should
have been clearly on the engagement
itself and what it vindicated or didn’t.
Sadly, however, and despite good intentions, Philbin falls well short of this aim.
His coverage of the actual battle is scanty
and disjointed, and the remainder of
the work is notably deficient or simply
inaccurate. This is doubly frustrating
given that this battle, the first of only
two dreadnought-versus-dreadnought
engagements in the entire war, probably
represented each side’s “last, best chance”
to put things right, so to speak, before
the better-known battle of Jutland a year
later. As such, it is indeed an important
area for study by the naval historian.
Philbin’s difficulties are threefold. First,
and as intimated, the balance is arguably
wrong between the coverage of the battle
itself and the supporting text. He devotes
only 30 of the 150 or so pages to actual
analysis of the battle, with the remaining
pages dealing with the supporting areas.
Unfortunately, these 30 pages, more than
many others, fall victim to the second
difficulty he has, which is in developing
a clear and coherent narrative of a series
of events, free from repetition and diversion. Rather than recounting the main
features of the engagement in a chronological fashion, he chooses to take the
different perspectives of the individual
ships involved, which does not help the
reader elucidate the decision making as
it might have appeared to the opposing fleet commanders at the time—a
feature central to his stated aim—and
leads to a nonsequential presentation of
the main events. None of this is helped
by the maps in the book that, although
reproductions of the original battle
reports and histories, are almost unreadable in the scale presented. Thus, despite
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